Abstract. The hierarchical access control scheme based on Chinese Reminder Theorem [49] (CRTHACS) was supposed to be capable of hiding hierarchical structure, but Geiselmann et al. [18] showed practical attacks on CRTHACS to reveal the hierarchies it hides. Then, Zou et al. modified it, and gave a new CRTHACS [50] to resist those attacks. Nevertheless, we find that the modified version is still defective if it permits changes of structure, i.e. the scheme works in a dynamic scenario. In this paper, we describe our attack on the modified version of CRTHACS. We extend the description of the CRTHACS in a more proper form making it easier for us to look into the problem it has. We find the key character of the vulnerability which we name as double-invariance. We generalize our attack in an algebraic form and apply it to a series of hierarchical cryptographic access control schemes that share the same vulnerability with CRTHACS. We also give the countermeasure to fix this vulnerability.
Introduction
The hierarchical access control (HAC) refers to a scenario in which the users or groups of members of a computer (or communication) system are divided into a number of disjoint security classes. One class may have more privilege than another, and thus it gives rise to a hierarchical structure of the group. Usually, we describe those relations by partial orders or a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
Since users or members in a same security class form a set, we call it a subgroup. In an HAC scheme, if subgroup G i has access to G j 's messages or data encrypted by his key, we say there is a partial order G j ≼ G i . A partial ordering ≼ on a set of subgroups G = {G 1 , · · · , G n } is a binary relation on S × S that for all G i , G j and G k in G, we have:
If G j ≼ G i holds, we may say G i is an ancestor of G j , or equally, G j is a descendant of G i . To describe the access hierarchy with a DAG, we can draw a directed line from G i to G j for every partial order G j ≼ G i . For simplicity, we may omit those lines that reflect an indirect partial order, i.e. if G 3 ≼ G 1 but there is a subgroup G 2 such that G 3 ≼ G 2 and G 2 ≼ G 1 , then we can omit the line from G 1 to G 3 as shown in Fig. 1 . Generally, HAC schemes focus on two kinds of structures: general structures as shown in Fig. 2 , and as special cases of them, the tree-like structures as shown in Fig. 3 . Mostly, there is a trusted third party as the group controller who controls the hierarchical dynamic changes and may help to compute and distribute subgroup keys.
The first cryptographic solution to HAC problems was proposed by Akl et al. [1] Their scheme uses discrete logarithm to help ancestral subgroup derive descendants' data encryption keys by using public information and his private knowledge. Afterwards, a large number of cryptographic HAC schemes have been proposed. Some of them use one way function to derive keys, in which keys in lower level depend on keys in higher level, such as Sandhu's [33] [3] and etc. Some other HAC schemes use different ways to derive keys so as to make keys independent from each other and lower the cost in the dynamic changes. Such schemes include Liaw's [31] , Zou's [48,49], Wu's [44] , Shen's [36] , Das's [15] , Tzeng's scheme [40] and etc.
Goldwassor et al. once described the status quo of designing key distribution schemes: 'The problem is deceptively simple. It is easy to propose protocols in which subtle security problems later emerge.' [19] So are HAC schemes which form a subclass of key distribution schemes. Many schemes mentioned above suffered various attacks: attack [22] on Liaw's [31] , attack [18] [20, 41] on Shen's [36] and Wu's [44] , attack [42] on Hwang's scheme [24] and etc. And some of them still have security flaws after amendment.
In this paper, we find a concrete attack on the improved scheme [50] of Zou's hierarchical access control scheme based on Chinese Reminder Theorem(CRTHACS) [49] . Though Zou's improved version is not the most efficient HAC scheme in the classification of Crampton [14] , we pay attention to it and feel worthy and interesting to study it mainly because of the following special reasons:
1. To our knowledge, it's the sole HAC scheme that claims to be able to hide the hierarchical structure and the receivers in communication. In this case, it sets an example for researchers and engineers who are looking for such properties. Thus, it's worthy of a better reexamination. 2. It's based on the Chinese Reminder Theorem, which can be deemed as the general form of many other methods. Analysis on CRTHACS is also critical to other HAC schemes which make use of them. Details see Section 3. 3. While some analyses [25, 46] on group-oriented protocols pay explicit attention to "inter-session" analysis in their formation of security notions, CRTHACS doesn't show much concern about this idea. It may result in security flaws even in a "formally proved" scheme [13, 17] when designers ignore it unconsciously. Our analysis may present a substantive example of showing how this kind of neglect imperils a protocol. This "inter-session" idea has a not very short history. The pioneering work of Bellare etc. [4, 5] formalized the notion of "sessions" of key establishment schemes and the security notion of "session key" in which the consideration of "inter-session" analysis is contained. In this security notion, it calls for a reductive proof on the independence of different sessions. Then lots of researches [3, 7, 11, 25, 29, 37, 46] followed this idea to give the formal definition of different types of group key management protocols. In Atallah's full length paper [3] , he discussed the security notion of indistinguishability and incomputability of HAC schemes under this framework. It's seems inevitable to dive into the inter-session relations if we are to seriously examine the security of a group key management scheme. When designers ignore it unconsciously, security flaws could emerge even in a "formally proved" scheme [13, 17] . However, CRTHACS doesn't show much concern about this idea. Our analysis may present a substantive example of showing how this kind of neglect imperils a protocol.
These points guided us in our research. In our study, we find that the scheme does indeed not fulfil the task of hiding the hierarchical structure. We also find that a series of HAC schemes share the similar vulnerability with CRTHACS. One [40] of them was even proposed in 2011, which showed an ignorance of the problem. Thus, we feel necessary to study the problem in depth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give our attack on CRTHACS. In Section 2.1, we briefly show how CRTHACS works; In Section 2.2, we give an exemplary attack on a concrete case of CRTHACS; In Section 2.2, we give a toy example; In Section 2.3, we generalize our attack in the form of algebra, and introduce time into the description of schemes; In Section 2.4, we show how to fix a scheme that is vulnerable to our attack. In Section 3, we apply our attack to some other HAC schemes and briefly describe our attack on one [15] of them. Section 4 concludes our paper.
Our Attack on CRTHACS
Zou et al.
[49] proposed a Chinese Remainder Theory (CRT) based Hierarchical Access Control Scheme (CRTHACS) aiming to hide the access hierarchy. Nevertheless, Geiselmann et al. [18] presented three practical attacks based on the greatest common divisor (GCD) that allowed for revealing at least parts of the hierarchy. Then, Zou et al. [50, 51] modified the scheme to resist those GCD attacks and maintain the property of hiding the hierarchy. Unfortunately, here we find another attack in dynamic scenarios to reveal the hierarchy in their modified CRTHACS. Some notations are given in Table 1 for reference.
Review of CRTHACS
CRTHACS [51] is applicable to general hierarchies. There is a trusted party as a group controller (GC). The entire group is divided into n disjoint subgroups
Users in these subgroups are managed by a subgroup controller, which is also denoted by G 1 , · · · , G n . Any proper group key management protocol can be used in a subgroup. The η ancestors of subgroup G i are denoted by G i1 , · · · , G iη , and the set of them is denoted by AG i .
Initialization:
The GC has a pair (P GC , S GC ) of public and private keys. Every subgroup G i has a pair (P i , S i ) of public and private keys respectively, and every member U l in subgroup G i has a pair (p l , s l ) of public and private keys. The GC chooses n + 1 pair-wise relatively prime numbers N 0 , N 1 , · · · , N n , then makes N 0 public and keeps N i in secret. G i randomly chooses his own data encryption key k i and sends E PGC (E Si (k i )) to the GC.
The GC decrypts all data encryption keys. For subgroup G i , the GC determines all of his η ancestors G i1 , · · · , G iη . Then the GC establishes the following system of η + 1 congruences and gets the solution of CRT i :
(1) Then, the GC sends E Pi (E SGC (N i , CRT i )) to subgroup controller G i . The subgroup controller decrypts them and sends them along with k i to users in the subgroup securely. Thus, subgroup Controller
Data Communication: When a user U l ∈ G i , with identity ID l , wants to send a message M, he sends (
, and then the message M . See Fig. 4 as an example. U 72 in group G 7 is sending a message M to users that have access to his level, i. e. users in group G 2 , G 4 and G 7 .
We notice that, when a user U l in subgroup G i sends a message M encrypted with k i , he actually publishes the CRT i of his own subgroup by sending
Dynamic Key Management: There are two levels of dynamics in CRTHACS, one is member dynamics such as members' joining, leaving, etc. in a subgroup. The other one is subgroup dynamics such as a subgroup's leaving or joining in the entire group. Member dynamic changes are dependent on the subgroup key management protocol, which are not considered here.
Subgroup dynamic changes include: adding, inserting, deleting, splitting a subgroup and modifying the key of a subgroup etc. For example, when adding a new subgroup G i into the group, the GC determines its ancestors. Then, after G i sends its secret data encryption key k i to GC securely, GC computes CRT i according to (1) and sends E Pi (E SGC (N i , CRT i )) to G i . If G i has any descendant G j , GC shall recompute CRT j and send it to G j securely.
A Heuristic Example of Attack
Our attack on CRTHACS is in a dynamic scenario. After several dynamic operations, an outsider attacker, who is even not in any security class, is probably able to find out at least part of the hierarchy which, according to the claim of the scheme, was supposed to be invisible to him. We give a heuristic example of attack as follows. We take the hierarchy in Fig. 2 as an example. We assume that the adversary A is able to wiretap all communications in the group, but unable to decrypt or sign a message with a key that he does not possess.
Since users in a same subgroup G i always share a common CRT i no matter whether it changes, A can roughly distinguish subgroups by their CRT i . Despite the fact that a user may move from one subgroup to another, A can identify the new group that the user belongs to with his new CRT i later on. A sees as much number of subgroups as the number of CRT i s used in the communications of the group.
When the protocol is initiated, the GC computes CRT 9 according to (2), and sends E P9 (E SGC (N 9 , CRT 9 )) to G 9 . When a user U l in G 9 wants to send a message M to others, he sends (ID l , CRT 9 , Signed M AC, {M } k9 ) to them, the CRT 9 is thereby made public to any adversary who has been listening to their public communications. Consequently, A knows that the user U l belongs to a subgroup corresponding to CRT 9 . Similarly, if a user U v ∈ G i sends out a message M ′ to others, he sends out 
Afterwards, we assume that G 3 modifies its data encryption key k 3 to k ′ 3 , as shown in Fig. 5 . Then, G 3 , G 5 ,G 6 and G 9 have to update their CRT i . The GC has to recompute CRT 9 using (3) by substituting k 3 in (2) with k
The adversary A who eavesdrops on the group communications, now finds out that a user's CRT i changed, from CRT 9 to CRT We shall make it clear that A identify G i with its CRT i , but he doesn't know what N i of a subgroup G i is, and which N i corresponds to which G i at the beginning. A subgroup's CRT i changes whenever there is a subgroup dynamic change at any of its ancestors. We show as follows what A may know after these two moves.
After the first move, the data encryption key k 3 's modification, CRT 6 and CRT 9 change to CRT ′ 6 and CRT 6 and N 8 corresponds to G 6 , and the worst case is that both of them belong to siblings of G 6 .
To get more clear of this, A should wait for more subgroup dynamic changes, especially of G 6 or his ancestors, to take place. After a few more subgroup dynamic changes, A may see some relational patterns emerge repeatedly, and thus be able to draw numbers of hierarchical relations between different subgroups.
Since the modulus N i of every leaf node subgroup G i (such as N 5 and N 9 ) has never shown up in the whole procedure of the protocol , and all that A can do is to infer from the moduli he gets in subgroup dynamic changes, he may not be able to figure out the exact structure of the hierarchy entirely. Despite this uncertainty, our attack of revealing the hierarchy protected by CRTHACS is still worth noting.
Toy Example
Here, we give a toy example of above. We set the length of the security parameter to be 10 bits. That is to say, the symmetric encryption {x} k is assumed to be a mapping whose range is between 1 and 2 10 . The moduli N i is restricted between 2 10 + 1 and 2 11 . Since the algorithm of symmetric encryption {x} k is irrelevant to our method of attack, we use a random table of the mapping to simulate it. We randomly choose those eleven pair-wise relatively prime numbers:
In description of CRTHACS, N 0 is public, and all of the other N i are kept secret.
We have encryption table of {k i } kj before and after k 3 's change, see Table 2 . We just list {k i } kj that are used in calculating CRT i and leave a block empty if the {k i } kj is not used.
We have CRT i , CRT Table 3 , and their differences in the same table.
An adversary may record the CRT i , so he has Table 3 . He tests whether a (CRT
If not, that means k i has changed during that session, and the corresponding difference ((CRT
can't be used to calculate moduli. In Table 3 , we have
. Then, the adversary knows k 3 has changed, and he calculates:
The adversary hereby gets "1992". If he knows that N i is restricted between 2 10 + 1 and 2 11 , which is normally public, he'll be sure that G 5 , G 6 and G 9 share a same ancestor whose modulus is 1992 , i. e. N 1 . He also may infer that G 3 is an ancestor of G 5 , G 6 and G 9 . Because N 0 (CRT ′ 3 − CRT 3 ), he may detect the change of G 3 's data key, which results in the changes of CRT 5 , CRT 6 and CRT 9 .
Furthermore, the adversary also gets a number 7281273177974280, which is the very product of N 1 , N 2 , N 4 , N 6 and N 8 . It's a very useful clue for further reasoning on G 9 's ancestors and the whole structure.
The Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we analyze the problem of CRTHACS. We generalize the core problem into an algebraic form, which may help us find out the similarity of those schemes that our attack can be adopted. To help with the analysis, we introduce time t into the description of CRTHACS as session ID. We know that in a group key management (GKM) protocol, we always identify a change with a session identity. These session identities are actually related with different time periods. But, in the description of the CRTHACS, there is no session identity.
Adding it into the scheme helps us describe the relations among sessions, and it is also the key to find out the vulnerability of this scheme.
Firstly, we use a more general and algebraic form to restate the problem. The general form of the Chinese Remainder Theorem can be formulated in rings and ideals. Hungerford has proved the following Theorem 1, i.e. Corollary 2.27 in his book Algebra [21] .
Theorem 1 (Chinese Remainder Theorem [21]). If I 1 , · · · , I ζ are ideals in a ring R, then there is a monomorphism of rings
If R 2 + I u = R for all u, and I u + I v = R (or say they are coprime) for all u ̸ = v, then θ is an isomorphism of rings.
In the CRTHACS, the integer ring Z is the instantiation of the ring R in Theorem 1. There are η ancestors
That is,
To describe the subgroup dynamic changes in CRTHACS more precisely, we introduce time t into the scheme. We extend our notations as in Table 4 . We denote a value V at time t by V [t]. We use the notion 'determinant subgroups' instead of ancestors in CRTHACS. After some subgroup dynamic changes, some determinant subgroups of G i may have modified their data encryption key, left or joined in the group and etc. , and certain determinant subgroups of G i may still keep unchanged. We denote the set of those unchanged subgroups as
Therefore, we rewrite (11) at time t to be (12),
For any determinant subgroup
. As a result, we have
Now, we may reexamine the problem of CRTHACS in the form of algebra. We suppose that R is a unique factorization domain (UFD) in the following text.
Therefore, they satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1. We have
Now, we substitute Z and ⟨N [t] i ⟩ in (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) with R and I[t] i , and retain other notations in Table 4 . We give as follows an exact definition of the critical feature of CRTHACS that makes our attack feasible.
Definition 1. We say a scheme PT is double-invariant if it holds
CRTHACS is an example of double-invariant schemes. Now, we generalize our attack to double-invariant schemes in the form of the following theories.
Lemma 1. In a double-invariant scheme PT, R is a unique factorization domain. I[t]
i pair-wise coprime ideals of R. θ is a monomorphism described by (15) . If there exists a nonempty set
where t 1 and t 2 are two distinct time points, satisfying t 1 < t 2 .
Proof. Follow the deduction above.
If in R factorization can be practically solved, then our attack will succeed in some trivial steps. But usually it is not. Moreover, (16) 
Lemma 2. In a double-invariant scheme PT, R is a Euclidean domain. I[t] i , i = 0, · · · , η[t] i are η[t] i pair-wise coprime ideals of R. θ is a monomorphism described by (15). If there exists a nonempty set CoIt[a(t 1 , t 2 ), b(t 3 , t 4 )], then the greatest common divisor d as
can be worked out efficiently, where GCD(α, β) means the greatest common divisor of α and β.
When a = b and t 2 = t 3 in CoIt[a(t 1 , t 2 ), b(t 3 , t 4 )], as a special case of Lemma 2, we have (15 
Lemma 3. In a double-invariant scheme PT, R is a Euclidean domain. I[t] i , i = 0, · · · , η[t] i are η[t] i pair-wise coprime ideals of R. θ is a monomorphism described by
can be worked out efficiently.
. Now, we have our main statement as follows.
Theorem 2. In a double-invariant scheme PT, R is a Euclidean domain. I[t] i , i = 0, · · · , η[t] i are η[t] i pair-wise coprime ideals of R. If the dynamic changes of determinant subgroups of a subgroup happen not only once, then we have a good chance to figure out the product of moduli of some of its determinant subgroups during dynamic changes (or the product of generators of ideals corresponding to those determinant subgroups).

Proof. Because every Euclidean domain R is also a principal ideal domain, the generator of every ideal I[t] i is an element ξ[t] i ∈ R.
Since the subgroup dynamic changes usually happen once on a determinant subgroup of a subgroup, nonempty U Gs and CoIts emerge continuously in dynamic scenarios. We assume that there are µ nonempty unchanged sets U G ai [t 2i−1 , t 2i ], i = 1, · · · , µ, and a nonempty conditional intersection CoIt[a 1 (t 1 , t 2 ), · · · , a µ (t 2µ−1 , t 2µ )]. Here we shall make clear that a i is identifier of subgroup, two different a i s may possibly identify a same subgroup G j .
By Lemma 1, we have
Then, by Lemma 2, we have
where ∆ a1(t1,t2),··· ,aµ(t2µ−1,t2µ) denotes:
We may rewrite (19) with notion of CoIt as (20) , the product of generators of the ideals corresponding to those subgroups in CoIt. In this case, d a1(t1,t2),··· ,aµ(t2µ−1,t2µ) is the very product we need, i.e. our attack succeeds.
The probability of ∆ a1(t1,t2),··· ,aµ(t2µ−1,t2µ) = 1 mainly depends on the following three factors:
1. what the ring R is; 2. the relations between U Gs and CoIt; 3. the types of subgroup dynamic changes in it.
Different rings have different rules of coprime, and thus they result in different probabilities.
If R is the integer ring Z, by the knowledge of probabilistic number theory [39] , the probability of two random numbers α, β to be coprime is
If R is a polynomial ring over a finite field F q where q is a prime number, by Sugita's analysis [38] , the probability of two random polynomial f, g to be coprime is
For the latter two factors, we took the integer ring Z as our example, furthered our reasoning in detail. For the sake of length, we leave them in Appendix A. In A.2, we give the estimated ranges of possibilities of success in consideration of different types of subgroup dynamic changes and relations between U Gs and CoIt. Generally, we find that the more the dynamic moves an adversary captures, the greater his probabilities of success are. The probabilities of success of our attack are pretty high.
Experiments in A.3 justify our analysis.
Theorem 2 is the main reason why our attack works. If the generators of ideals in a scheme are prime, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In a double-invariant scheme PT, R is a Euclidean domain. If all ideals I[t] i in (15) are prime, the factorization is practical in R and the dynamic changes of determinant subgroups of a subgroup happen not only once, then we have a good chance to figure out the generators of ideals of some of its unchanged determinant subgroups.
Countermeasure
We find from the lemmas above and Theorem 2, that the double-invariance of CRTHACS is the critical cause of its security vulnerability. So, removing it is the key to protect schemes from our attack. We can fulfil this by adding some session/time-related 'salt' into rem[t] i or I[t] i to make them distinct in each session/time.
In CRTHACS, for a subgroup G i , GC computes CRT i through (1), which can be represented as (24) at t 1 .
In CRTHACS, if a subgroup change of an ancestor of G i takes place at time t 2 , to any other ancestors The hash function is a public cryptographic hash function with a negligible probability of collision. We omit the formal proof here for the sake of length.
Our Attack on Other Schemes
The general form of Chinese Remainder Theorem, i.e. Theorem 1, plays a very important part in modern cryptography.
We notice that instances of general form of CRT that are applied to build secret sharing schemes, could also be used to build key management protocols for a group with hierarchy. For example, Chinese Reminder Theorem is applied to build a secret sharing scheme [2] [45] , could also be transformed to group key management protocols for HAC. All the methods of these secret sharing schemes are the very instances of general form of CRT. Shamir's secret sharing scheme [35] may probably be the best known example of the above. His scheme makes use of polynomial interpolation over a finite field. We represent the interpolation method in a form similar to (9) as follows.
In a finite filed F , given ζ points (x 1 , y 1 ), · · · , (x ζ , y ζ ) with distinct x i 's, we are able to build up a polynomial f (x) of degree (ζ − 1) by using following equations,
In fact, this is an isomorphism described by
where
Many schemes of group key management for HAC make use of this, such as Shen's [36] , Wu's scheme [44] and etc. , and the modified versions [15, 20, 40] of them. Unfortunately, all of the above are double-invariant schemes and hence vulnerable to our attack. Take Das's scheme [15] as an example. Das's scheme is a hierarchical group key management scheme using Newton's interpolation function [34] . It's applied to a tree-like hierarchy as shown in Fig. 7 . All computations run over a finite field F . In his scheme, k i is G i 's data encryption key, ID i is G i 's unique identity. h is a cryptographic hash function. GC computes Newton's interpolation function
Then G i is able to derive his descendant
Compare it with the notations in Table 4 , in Das's scheme at time t,
Since if a subgroup dynamic change takes place at a descendant G ic of G i during time between t 1 and t 2 , we can see that both
Thus, this scheme is doubleinvariant. By Theorem 2, Das's scheme is not secure in dynamic scenarios.
For example, we assume that at time t 1 Das's scheme is applied to a group with the hierarchy in Fig. 7 , and G 6 happens to leave the group on the morrow of that at t 2 . For
at time t 1 , and
at time t 2 . By Lemma 1, we have (
). Since finding roots of a polynomial of degree 3 over a finite field can be practically solved by algorithms [6, 9, 27] , h(ID 5 ||k 3 ) and h(ID 3 ||k 3 ) can be worked out as roots of (H ′ 3 (x) − H 3 (x)). Then, we can get data encryption keys of G 3 and G 5 : (ID 5 ||k 3 ) ). Actually, all data encryption keys of the group except k 6 will be revealed in the same way if our object of analysis is G 1 instead of G 3 . Furthermore, by Lemma 3 and Theorem 2, it'll be much easier to break the scheme if there are two or more dynamic changes taking place in the group. We use the special form of Lemma 2, which is Lemma 3, since in Das's scheme whenever a ̸ = b, CoIt[a(t 1 , t 2 ), b(t 3 , t 4 )] is an empty set.
We shall mention that our attack on Das's scheme is very similar to Wang's attack [41] on Shen's scheme [36] . It's easy to see that Wang's attack is another instance of our Theorem 2.
The countermeasure to fix Das's scheme is very similar to that of CRTHACS shown in Section 2.4. So, we omit it here. Zou's another scheme [48] is also an HAC scheme that makes use of polynomial interpolation, and it successfully avoided double-invariance by adding a random integer z into I[t] i as a session identity (session-related 'salt'). However, we would like to remind readers that it's not the randomness but the uniqueness of z because of which the property of double-invariance is removed off.
Conclusion
In this paper, we gave an attack to reveal the structures of the hierarchy that the modified CRTHACS [50] intended to hide. We generalized the attack in the form of rings and their isomorphisms. We redefined the problem in a more proper form represented in time, as shown in Table 4 and (12), (13), (15) . We defined the key vulnerability of this scheme to our attack as double-invariance and showed how to resist the attack in the general form.
We also pointed out that a series of HAC schemes share the same problem with CRTHACS, and gave an exemplary attack on one of them, i.e. Das's scheme [15] , so as to remind readers that this vulnerability doesn't only belong to CRTHACS but is of some generality in certain types of HAC schemes.
To design HAC protocols is "deceptively easy", we shall be more careful than ever. "Provable security" and "reductionist" tradition offers a body of work to follow, including models and definitions as well as examples [5, 11, 26] . Some studies [3, 16, 43] have already taken use of them to design provably secure HAC schemes. 
A Notes on theorem 2
In our Theorem 2, in order to estimate the probability of ∆ a1(t1,t2),··· ,aµ(t2µ−1,t2µ) = 1 in (22), we have to take an examination on the probability of coprimality of numbers, each of which is a product of several random numbers.
A.1 Probability of Coprimality
The probability Pr(1, 1) of two random numbers A 1 and A 2 to be coprime can be deducted as follows. For a prime number p, the probability of p GCD(A 1 , A 2 ) is 1− 
. Thus, we have:
Similarly, we can get the probability Pr(i 1 , · · · , i ν ) of ν numbers, each of which is a product of i j random numbers, where j = 1, · · · , ν.
It's hard for us to give the exact analytical form of (31) like what we did to Pr(1, 1), so we use the asymptotic result instead. For example, Pr(1, 2) ≈ 0.4283 and Pr(2, 3, 5) ≈ 0.1926.
A.2 Different Cases in Subgroup Dynamics
There are several kinds of subgroup dynamic changes, mainly including a subgroup's leaving, joining the entire group, data key changes of it and etc. Different dynamic changes lead to different probability of ∆ a1(t1,t2) ,··· ,aµ(t2µ−1,t2µ) = 1, which is because they form different types of products of random numbers, and thus related to the probability of coprimality we studied in A.1. We explain it in detail as follows.
Take CRTHACS as the example. In our heuristic attack in Section 2.2, we suppose that the system initialled at t 1 . We put an imaginary subgroup G 0 corresponding to N 0 . It happens two times of subgroup changes; one is the change of data key k 3 of G 3 at t 2 , the other one is adding a new subgroup G 10 at t 3 .
By the solution of Chinese Remainder Theorem, after k 3 's change, it holds that,
where Inv 5,3 , Inv 6,3 and Inv 9,3 satisfy:
In the new notations of Table 4 , it holds that
Comparing (34) to (21) and (22), we have
We may treat N i and (
) as random numbers. Since Inv 5,3 and Inv 6,3 are determined by (33) , they can't be considered as random. However, we can't treat them as fixed numbers that do not affect the probability. We may treat them as semi-random.
Though we don't know the exact probability of ∆ 5(t1,t2),6(t1,t2) = 1, we may estimate the range of it. It's larger than Pr(2, 4) when we consider Inv as random, and smaller than Pr(1, 3) when otherwise:
i.e. it is between 0.0911 and 0.3371. With slight difference, we have that the probability Prob[∆ 5(t1,t2),6(t1,t2),9(t1,t2) = 1] is in range [Pr(2, 4)Pr(2, 2) + (1 − Pr(2, 4))Pr(2, 3),
i.e. it is in range [0.1391, 0.3679].
After t 3 , a new subgroup G 10 is added in the hierarchy. We denotes M :
where T otalSuM denotes what is in the square bracket in (38) , Inv 
Thus by (39) , N i |(Inv . Thus, T otalSuM is an integer. Since in it there are many {k i } kj s, which we consider as random, we may treat T otalSuM as a random integer.
Using 
Comparing to (21), we have ∆ 9(t1,t2),9(t2,t3) = GCD(CRT9−CRT Similar to the deduction of (36), we have, Pr(2, 2) < Prob[∆ 9(t1,t2),9(t2,t3) = 1] < Pr(1, 2),
i.e. the probability is between 0.2178 and 0.4283.
We may further our explore on the structural relation between U Gs and CoIt, and infer that Prob[∆ 5(t1,t2),6(t1,t2),9(t1,t2),9(t2,t3) = 1] is in range [0.1443, 0.3716]. We also claim that the analysis of a subgroup's leaving is more or less the same as its joining, since these two moves are symmetric in terms of time. Details are omitted here.
We now see that Prob[∆ = 1] indeed depends on the relations between U Gs and CoIt. Different dynamic operations will result in different chances of success of our attack. Generally, the more the dynamic moves an adversary captures, the greater his chances of success are. The possibilities of success are too big to be ignored, which are exemplified by (36) , (43) and etc.
A.3 Simulation of Attack
We simulate our attack in a similar way of our toy example, but set the security parameter to be 100 bits. We repeat our attack 10 5 times and then record the ratios of success. The results coincident with our analysis in A.2. The ratios are considered to be asymptotic to the real probabilities when the number of repetitions is large. We present them as follows. We test a series of security parameters, from 10 to 250 bits, and find that it has no noticeable effect on the ratios of success. The number of repetitions also doesn't affect these ratios considerably. For example, in the test of 10 bits the length of security parameter, 10 7 the times of repetitions, the results are (0.1599, 0.2587, 0.3842, 0.3540), which only show very little difference with (44) .
Magma [9] programming language is adopted in simulations. Please feel free to contact authors for source codes. 
Notations
Meaning t
The temporal identity to identify a short period of time, in which no subgroup dynamic change takes place.
CRTi[t]
The CRTi of Gi computed by GC at time t.
AGi[t]
The set of all determinant subgroups of Gi at time t, which may be ancestors or descendants or any other specific subgroups, depending on the scheme.
η[t]i
The
number of members in AGi[t], η[t]i = |AGi[t]|. G[t]i l A determinant subgroup of Gi at time t. N [t]i
The corresponding modulus of Gi at time t.
I[t]i
The ideal of R corresponding to Gi at time t.
ξ[t]i
The generator of an ideal I[t]i in a principal ideal domain.
rem[t]i
The remainder class of CRTi [t] , see also (22) .
